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Abstract
The article proposes a comparative study of the Soviet Thaw, initiated by Nikita Khrush-
chev after the 20th Congress of the Party, and the contemporary Russia with a special em-
phasis on the international relations between Russia and the United States. Attempts have 
been made to draw some parallels between the Khrushchev Thaw and the President Putin 
parade diplomacy. The paper provides a detailed analysis of the parade diplomacy and 
neo-Stalinist tendencies hovering over the country today as well as dwells upon the role of 
carnival within Russian propaganda shedding a new light on the Kremlin actual strategy.
Over the past seventy years the United States and the Soviet Union (afterward 
Russia) were two powers with the unchanged vital interests and constant diplomatic 
course. Obviously they have gone through numerous ups and downs in their rela-
tionship also called the periods of détente and tensions. The Thaw, beginning from 
the 20th Party in 1956, where the doctrine of peaceful coexistence was put forward 
by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, and lasted until the end of his rule in 1964, 
was a notorious phase of détente. From 1955 until 1960 the Soviet-American rela-
tions reached their peak. However, even this idyll was not free from hostility. In-
deed, the paradox of the Thaw period lies in manifesting official friendly diplomacy 
both by the Soviet Union and the US in the “Spirit of Geneva” and simultaneously 
practicing the fiercest offensive on the cultural field since the wartime. By studying 
those five years of outstanding closeness between the “natural enemies,”1 one can 
better understand their most intimate motives and expectations.
This paper falls into two parts: firstly, it expounds on the roots of the Thaw 
ideology shaped by Russia’s traditional ambivalent relationship to the West, in 
fact an eerie mix of fear and attraction as shown by the Soviet diplomatic and 
cultural choices during the second half of the 1950s. Moreover, Soviet official 
prose elaborated this eerie narrative transforming the Thaw political language into 
literature and making it more accessible to the masses. The paper deals precisely 
with two case studies of Socialist Realist authors—fussy followers of the Party 
line—and makes an attempt to extract the ideological content from their works. 
Secondly, I assume that if history does not repeat itself it often rhymes. Basing on 
1 Robert C. Grogin, Natural Enemies. The United States and the Soviet Union in the 
Cold War, 1917-1991 (Lanham : Lexington Books, 2001).
this assumption, a parallel is drawn between two five years periods: 1955-1960 
and 2009-2014. A closer look at the 2009-2014 years will reveal the fact President 
Obama’s double mandate has indeed much in common with Dwight Eisenhower’s 
presidency. Apart from similarities in the geopolitical game between the US and 
the former Soviet Union in the 1950s and half a century later, the both countries 
share a common ground of political sensibility. This is why it seems crucial to 
elaborate a more accurate conception of the Thaw consciousness not only to un-
derstand the Kremlin current strategy, but also to grasp some key features of the 
Russian-American modus vivendi in the long run.
1- Waging the Cultural War: Ideological Patterns of the Thaw
An ‘Armed Thaw’
It seems that the oxymoron “armed truce,” used by the scholar Hugh Thomas 
in his book on the beginnings of the Cold War,2 is also relevant for the Thaw pe-
riod. In 1953 there were several factors involved in the pacification of interna-
tional relations. Firstly, the change of leaders of the two superpowers gave hope 
that a compromise could be found easier than between “Uncle Joe” and the “petty 
shopkeeper” (as Joseph Stalin and Harry Truman scornfully called each other in 
private). Secondly, both the American and the Soviet people were exhausted after 
the first round of the Cold War3 and the Peace Movement had millions of support-
ers around the world. Thirdly, politicians were limited by the costs of war. In order 
to avoid “an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster,”4 President 
Eisenhower put forward the New Look policy in 1953 based on deterrence through 
the concept of massive retaliation. In his New Course speech, given before the Su-
preme Soviet on 8 August 1953, Georgy Malenkov seemed to hold a similar idea.5
Undoubtedly, Stalin’s death allowed the diplomatic Thaw. On 15 March 
Malenkov—considered at the time as the Kremlin heir—delivered a speech be-
fore the Supreme Soviet, where he argued that conflicts between Moscow and 
Washington should “be decided by peaceful means, on the basis of mutual under-
standing.” Washington then seized the opportunity of a brief power vacuum to en-
gage in the path of the détente. On 16 April 1953—only three months after his in-
auguration day—President Eisenhower delivered the “Chance for Peace Speech” 
where he clearly expressed his will to reduce defense spending and warned 
against the dangers of starting the arms race; in December of the same year it 
was followed by the “Atoms for Peace Speech.” In July 1955, Khrushchev and 
Eisenhower first met at the Geneva Summit, dedicated to disarmament and inter-
2 Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce. The Beginnings of the Cold War. 1945-1946 (London: 
Sceptre, 1988). The title is inspired by a quote by Dean Acheson to President Truman on 
September 25, 1945: if co-operation is impossible, “there will be no organized peace but 
an armed truce.”
3 On Soviet mentalities in the mid 1950s, see Yuri Aksîutin, “Khrushchevskaĭa Otte-
pel” i obshchestvennye nastroenĭa v SSSR v 1953-1964 gg. (Moscow: Rosspen, 2010), 
179-188; Hugh Thomas talks about a “truce of exhaustion” in Armed Truce, 32.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1961), 66.
5 Aksîutin, “Khrushchevskaîa Ottepel,” 67 and Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: 
the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapell Hill: the University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007), 96.
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national security. The summit enhanced communication and trust between the two 
states, arousing the so-called “Spirit of Geneva.” About half a year later, the 20th 
Congress of the Party made a decision that Soviet foreign policy should be based 
on the principle of peaceful coexistence, articulated for the first time by Georgy 
Chicherin in 1922 and reaffirmed in the Third Program of the Communist Party in 
1961. In September 1959, Khrushchev flew to the US; subsequently his visit was 
favorably highlighted in the books Living in Peace and Friendship,6 and Face to 
face with America.7 Needless to say, the diplomatic progress during this trip was 
negligible on both sides (related to the temporary lifting of the Soviet ultimatum 
on Berlin), but the result was that it showed the perception of the American people 
by the Soviet delegation summarized in Khrushchev’s address to Americans on 
television, ending with the words: “Good bye! Good luck! Friends!”8
As a token of the diplomatic rapprochement in US-Soviet relations in the wake 
of the Spirit of Geneva, cultural exchanges were significantly fostered during the 
Thaw covering almost all aspects of cultural and social life such as the theater, 
music, books, newspapers, broadcasts like Music USA, museums and exhibitions.9 
In January 1956 the Soviets proposed a twenty-year treaty of friendship putting 
much stress on broader artistic contacts; later they advanced the idea of new film 
cooperation. On 9 October 1956, an agreement was signed for a renewed circula-
tion of magazines within the two countries, such as Amerika and USSR. In return, 
the United States Information Agency raised the budget on cultural and informa-
tion programs to $325 million.10 This open-door policy culminated in the cultural 
agreement signed on 27 January 1958 (also known as the Lacy-Zarubin agreement), 
which implied the exchange of films, scholars, sportsmen, artists, and writers.
But cultural exchanges were dominated not only by philanthropy. At the 
very outbreak of the Cold War, state policies from both sides had already laid the 
ground for an intense cultural struggle; and during the Thaw, in an unexpected 
although logical way, the more the threat of an armed war moved away, the harder 
6 Zhit’ v mire i druzhbe, translated in english Khrushchev in America (Moscow: Gos-
politizdat, 1959). It gathered speeches, accounts on press conferences, and meetings of the 
Soviet leader.
7 Alexey Adzhubey (ed.), Litsom k litsu s Amerikoĭ (Moscow: Politizdat, 1960).
8 William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: Norton and 
Company, 200), 439.
9 Useful studies on the influence of American and British music on the Soviet Union 
include: Danielle Fosler-Lussier, Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2015); David Caute, The Dancer Defects: the Struggle for 
Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2003), 377-467; Yale 
Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University 
Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2004), 205-209; Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo 
Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 10, 13, 34, 225; Alexander Bratersky, “Back in the USSR: The 
Beatles Shaped a Generation in Soviet Russia,” The Telegraph, January 25, 2008.
10 Theodore Streitbert, « Memorandum for the President, » Sept. 4, 1955, General 
Correspondence ad Memoranda Series, Box 3, John Foster Dulles Papers, DDEL; FRUS 
1955-1957, IX: 556-558, quoted in Walter Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, 
Culture, and the Cold War (New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 1998), 104.
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the propaganda offensive became. As for the CIA, it had created the Council for 
Cultural Freedom (CCF) in June 1950 in West Berlin in order to aggregate intel-
lectuals against Communism and to promote an artistic production founded on 
liberal democratic principles.11 The CCF had operative offices in 35 countries and 
produced many publications, musical works and international events. In October 
1950 the project TROY defined “the intellectual framework for waging total Cold 
War” and proposed models of cooperation between universities and National State 
bureaucracy to get information into the Soviet Union.12 When Eisenhower came 
to power, he planned to make psychological warfare the chore of the Cold War 
strategy, “understanding that the struggle was going on between the East and the 
West for people’s minds and people’s adherence,” as one subordinate recalled.13
In the Soviet Union, on the suggestion of writer Konstantin Simonov to 
Malenkov, the Office for Agitation and Propaganda launched a “Plan of measures 
for the strengthening of anti-American propaganda in the near future” in April 
and May 1949. It allowed systematic work with the mobilization of all the Soviet 
propaganda players such as in the media, cinema, literature and the theatre. Im-
pressive polemical production blossomed in the following years and until Stalin’s 
death. But literature remained in the Soviet cultural arsenal. At the end of the war, 
the Soviet Union already had twenty years of experience of propaganda litera-
ture. According to the definition coined during the First Congress of the Soviet 
writers held in 1934, “Socialist Realism is the basic method of Soviet literature 
and literary criticism. It demanded of the artist the truthful, historically concrete 
representation of reality in its revolutionary development.” In the 1930s the Red 
Army viewed fiction as “one of the most powerful tools for the organization and 
education of the masses.”14 This doctrine was maintained later on. Official litera-
ture was the language of power used to address its people and the whole world. 
At the Second Congress in 1954 Alexey Surkov, poet and First Secretary of the 
Directorate of the Writers’ Union, proclaimed that “Literature is the sharp-edged 
weapon of socialist-political action.”15 
Under the Spell of the Enemy (the Party Line on the Western Threat)
To be sure, mutual perception during the Cold War was not just shaped from 
above; the American citizens met it with eagerness: there was an “outpouring 
of enthusiasm for the American appearances of Soviet musicians Emil Gilels, 
David Oistrakh, and Mstislav Rostropovich in winter 1955 and spring 1956;”16 
11  Frances S. Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War 
(London: Granta Books, 2000), Chap. 4.
12 Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 36.
13 Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 21.
14 “Boevoĭ otrîad na fronte literatury” (Combat Detachment on the Literary Front), 
Literaturnaya Gazeta, August 5, 1930 quoted in M.T Hooker, The Military Uses of Litera-
ture. Fiction and the Armed Forces in Soviet Literature (Westport: Greenwood Publishing 
Group, 1996), 2.
15 A.A. Surkov, “O sostoîanii i zadachakh sovetskoj literatury” (On the State and 
Tasks of Soviet Literature), in Vtoroĭ s”ezd sovetskikh pisateleĭ: stenograficheskiĭ otchet 
(Moscow: Sovetskiĭ pisatel’, 1956), 31.
16 Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 107.
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during those years, about 2,500 American musicians, intellectuals and politicians 
visited the USSR.17 Reciprocally, far from being seen as an enemy, America was 
very popular among the Soviet population: “Embassy personnel, tourists, and 
other Westerners in Moscow received daily evidence, based on their contacts with 
Soviet citizens, of the growing appeal of Western ideas and information in the 
USSR.”18 One example of the appeal of the American way of life for the Thaw 
generation was the American National Exhibition set up in Moscow in the sum-
mer of 1959. Harold McClellan, one of its chief organizers, suspected that its 
actual attendance exceeded the official figure of 2.7 million: “They came in under 
the fence and over the fence. On one crowded day I checked what seemed to me 
as high as twenty percent pushing their way in with no tickets at all, simply be-
cause the guards and ticket takers at the gate were unable to restrain them.”19 Very 
early in the Thaw and despite the Kremlin’s official position, “embassy personnel 
monitored evidence in the Soviet press of increased sensitivity to the danger of 
ideological contamination.”20 Another example is the World Festival for Youth 
and Students, held in Moscow in the summer of 1957: “to reduce the contacts 
between foreigners and ordinary people, the regime successfully strove to occupy 
the foreign guests, so that they had no time left.”21
In spite of regaining tensions at the beginning of the 1960s (like the U2 inci-
dent22 or the Cuban Missile Crisis23), they did not change much in the perception 
17 J.D. Parks, Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence: American-Soviet Cultural Rela-
tions, 1917-1958 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 1983), 153-171.
18 Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 114.
19 Hixson, Parting the Curtain: 201; see also Susan Reid, “Who Will Beat Whom? 
Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959,” Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 9 (4) (2008), 855-904. Reid characterizes 
the Soviet reception of American way of life as more complex and contradictory than only 
appeal. Resorting to the comment books of the exhibition, it appears that, in spite of the 
fascination for American goods, the Soviet people expressed their pride for socialist values 
of equality, education, work: “they did not accept the acquisitive consumerist domesticity 
represented by the exhibition as the measure of modernity and freedom” and called for a 
“different model of consumer society.”
20 John C. Guthrie, “Soviet Sensibility to Possible Contamination Effects of East-
West Cultural Ties,” January 8, 1957, Box 42, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary Series, DDEL 
quoted in Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 114.
21 Aksîutin, “Khrushchevskaîa Ottepel’,” 302.
22 On 1 May 1960, the Soviet Air Defence Forces shot down a United States U-2 spy 
plane while it was performing photographic aerial reconnaissance deep into Soviet territo-
ry. The pilot Francis Gary Powers parachuted safely and was captured. It happened around 
two weeks before the opening of an east-west summit in Paris. At his arrival, Khrushchev 
said he would only take part to the negotiations after the US publicly apologized for the spy 
plane. The American side refused and the Soviet delegation left the summit ; consequently, 
Eisenhower’s planned trip to Moscow in June was scrapped.
23 The Cuban Missile Crisis was a 13-day (October 16–28, 1962) confrontation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union due to American ballistic missile deploy-
ment in Italy and Turkey with consequent Soviet ballistic missile deployment in Cuba. It 
was the highest point of tension during the Cold War, when the superpowers came closer 
than ever to nuclear war.
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of the American world. On the opposite, the Soviet and American people have 
developed solidarity by experiencing the same threat, urged both by the mutually 
assured destruction doctrine and by adventurous hotheaded leaders. Short in time, 
unexpected and paroxysmal, these crises left nothing more than a purely political, 
superficial impact on the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people, and the US 
continued to hold the Soviet imagination under their spell. Despite the official me-
dia’s attempts to diminish the importance of the Western appeal to Soviet youth,24 
these events did not alter its greed for American material goods, way of life nei-
ther dampened their enthusiasm for jazz music. As Pyotr Vail and Alexander Ge-
nis rightly put it, “the 1960s did not know America, but they believed in it <…> 
1963—[John] Kennedy’s murder is perceived in Russia like a national tragedy 
<…> the travel notes by Ilf and Petrov Little Golden America are a cult book.”25 
The Soviet leader was not an exception here; he too was hypnotized by his 
American counterpart. Without changing the Stalinist rhetoric, saying to his lieu-
tenants that they would not be able to stand against the imperialists,26 Khrushchev 
developed an inferiority complex, a mixed feeling of fear and fascination towards 
Eisenhower and his people.27 However, after the Soviet leader’s triumphal trip to 
the United States in 1959, he decided to befriend the Americans.28 Victor Sukho-
drev, a Soviet interpreter, who used to accompany Khrushchev to summit meet-
ings, recalls that “Kennedy was the most impressive of all. No doubt he was an 
outstanding person, intellectual, handsome and charismatic <…> After his mur-
der, Khrushchev was genuinely disappointed and sent his closest mate among the 
Soviet executives—Anastas Mikoyan <…> Shortly before his death, [Kennedy] 
delivered his “Peace Speech” at the American University, where he pleaded for 
a turning point in the Soviet-American relations and for a kind of “reset.” This 
endeavor was positively met by Khrushchev.”29 
24 In his conclusions on monitoring the values Soviet youth conducted in 1961 by the 
newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, author Boris Grushin argues that “the second place of 
this negative feature ( i.e. sycophancy of the youth toward the West) after drunkenness was 
very unexpected by the specialists; they related that to one of the massive misperceptions 
of public opinion <…> that belief has proved to be deeply exaggerated <…> copying of the 
Western fashion is viewed as a thorn in the flesh, as a provocative, unacceptable, unfami-
liar and thus dangerous thing” see Boris Grushin, Chetyre zhizni Rossii v zerkale oprosov 
obshchestvennogo mnenîa. Ocherki massovogo soznanîa rossiyan vremion Khrushcheva, 
Brezhneva, Gorbacheva i Eltsina v 4-h knigah. Zhizn’ 1-îa. Epoha Khrushcheva (The Four 
Lives of Russia in the Mirror of Public Opinion Polls. Essays on the Russian Collective 
Consciousness under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev and Eltsin in four volumes. Life 
Number 1: Khrushchev’s Time ) (Moscow: Progress-Traditsiîa, 2001), 208-209, 216, 418.
25 Pyotr Vail and Alexander Genis, 60-ie: Mir Sovetskogo Cheloveka (The 1960s: the 
World the Soviet Man) (Moscow: Corpus, 2013), 39.
26 Fiodor Burlatskiĭ, Nikita Khrushchev (Moscow: Ripol Classic, 2003), 191.
27 Aksîutin, “Krushchevskaîa Otepel’,” 328; Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 177.
28 Leonid Mlechin, Khrushchev (Saint Petersburg: Amfora, 2015), 406.
29 Data from Victor Sukhodrev’s speaking at the radio channel Ekho Moskvy. Quoted 
in Vitaly Dymarskiĭ, Vremena Khrushcheva. V liudiakh, faktakh i mifakh (In Khrushchev’s 
Times. People, Facts and Myths) (Moscow: AST, 2011), 312-313.
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Depicted in the lexicon borrowed from virology, this ideological contamina-
tion was the core of the Soviet doctrine towards the US during the Thaw. The 
enemy was no longer a spy aimed to cause material or physical damage to the 
country (like the saboteurs in the 1930s or the Nazi invaders); this new enemy was 
feared for his subversive actions and possible impact on the imaginary world and 
moral consciousness of the Soviet people. Like the snake in the Garden of Eden, 
the threat coming from the US was no longer destructive but seductive.30 Two 
novels published during the Thaw present a particularly high ideological value in 
regard to their double function: not only did they reflect the mottos of power at a 
precise time, but reciprocally, their content has contributed in shaping the Soviet 
picture of the Western threat.
Case studies of two Thaw heralds: Vsevolod Kochetov and Ivan Shevtsov
The first author, Vsevolod Kochetov (1912-1973) was a Stalinist orthodox. 
After he spent World War II on the front line as a war correspondent, he began his 
literary career with military prose. With The Brothers Yershov (1958) and What Do 
You Want Then? (1969), he engaged in ideological debates in the wave of intense 
cultural antagonism with the West and of the technical revolution. In those two 
books, he displays the principles of socialist ethics and blames subversive action 
of the imperialist camp against the Soviet Union. Also, from 1954 he was a mem-
ber of the Writers’ Union executive board. Later in 1961, he was appointed as the 
editor-in-chief of the journal Oktîabr’, the mouthpiece of the conservative wing, 
consisting of Marxist ideology—basically National bolshevism31–, and the Social-
ist Realist canon. In 1959, it became the writers of the RSFSR’s32 organ, which 
aimed to counterweight the authors of liberal sensibilities published in Novy Mir.
Except for Novy Mir and Oktîabr’, the third voice in the literary polyphony 
of the Thaw was Molodaîa Gvardiîa.33 Inspired by the ideas of the Slavophiles, 
the editorial line was genuinely patriotic. Certainly not all nationalists were anti-
Semite; however, some of them had supported the anti-cosmopolitan campaign; 
among them, the sculptor Evgeny Vuchetich was one of the leaders of the so-
called “Russian Party.”34 They were convinced of the importance to inform the 
30 One can find a concentration of such views in the book by Mikhail Lifshitz and 
Lidiîa Reinhardt, The Crisis of Ugliness (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1968). It contains a paper 
written by Lifshitz in 1963 untitled “Why Am I Not a Modernist?” His answer can be 
resumed in a few words: “modernism is the greatest treason by the mandarins of culture 
<…> the petty adjustment by professors and men of letters to the reactionary politics of the 
imperialist states, <…> the Gospels of the new Barbarism, <…> voluntary obscurantism,” 
187-188.
31 David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Forma-
tion of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2002).
32 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Repuiblic
33 On the patriotic movement, see Nikolaĭ Mitrokhin, Russkaîa Partiîa: Dvizhenie 
Russkih Natsionalistov v SSSR, 1953-1985 gg. (The Russian Party: the Russian Nationa-
lists’ Movement) (Moscow: Novoie Literaturnoie Obozrenie, 2003), 160-169 on the natio-
nalist literary circles.
34 Mitrokhin, The Russian Party.
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Party about the Jewish influence on Soviet artistic life. In 1949, Vuchetich be-
friended the writer Ivan Shevtsov (1920-2013)—the second author of the case 
study—after the latter had published an article, “Against the anti-patriotic critics 
in the battle painting.”35Afterwards, Shevtsov became one of the representatives 
of the Russian Party. He also belonged to the generation of war—he had fought 
during World War II as a border guard. Then he worked as a special correspondent 
and as a deputy editor-in-chief of several newspapers. But his journalistic career 
was put to an end following the scandal around the publishing of Plant Louse 
(1964), his novel targeting the Jewish liberal intelligentsia and its deleterious in-
fluence on Soviet society. 
In his work, Shevtsov described the ideological struggle between a group of 
Russian “realists” and art critics in favour of abstract art. Most of them were Jew-
ish and gathered under the auspices of Lev Barselonsky, a clear allusion to Ilya 
Ehrenburg. The novel, a “rabidly anti-intellectual, Stalinist novel,”36 was written 
in 1950 in the wake of the cosmopolitan campaign. But it was published only 
after Khrushchev’s attack on avant-garde artists at the Manezh Exhibition. Many 
years later, the author recalled Vuchetich’s phone call: - “I will tell you the details 
in person, he said in excitement. I am now at home with [Aleksandr] Gerasimov, 
[Aleksandr] Laktionov, and other comrades. We just arrived from the Manezh. 
Join us immediately. You have precisely a novel on painters. It’s just the right 
time now.”37 And one hundred thousand copies of Plant Louse were published. 
The novel urged a salvo of outraged criticism,38 and the new host of the Kremlin 
eventually decided to get rid of an embarrassing courtier of his predecessor.
Although What Do You Want Then? dates back from 1969, it is associated 
with the Thaw, since it is a concentration of its author’s views, a typical char-
acter of that time. The intrigue of the novel is simple: the capitalists decided to 
undermine the Soviet Union from within. To achieve this goal, they resorted to 
the services of various people who had personal reasons to settle accounts with 
the communist system, for example, the CIA agent Portsia Brown, former SS 
Uwe Klauberg, who wanted to take revenge after the lost war. His colleague Peter 
Saburov, the son of a white emigrant, promised to return to former Russia, from 
where he fled with his parents while still a small child. Implementing a UNES-
CO treaty in the field of cultural relations between the US and the Soviet Union, 
this unlikely team hid a Machiavellian plan: to conduct a sabotage action under 
the pretext of the publishing order by the London based publishing house “New 
World,” which wanted to show the world photographs of the best Russian icons. 
So, Kochetov displayed a team of Apostles of Evil engaging in the ‘cold crusade.’ 
35 Ivan Shevtsov, Nikolaĭ Zhukov, Khristofor Ushenin, “Protiv kritikov-antipatriotov 
v batal’noĭ zhivopisi,” Krasnaîa Zvezda, April 1949.
36 Yitzhak Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State 
1953-1991 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 64.
37 Ivan Shevtsov, Plant Louse (Moscow: Golos, 2000), 3.
38 Zinoviĭ Papernyĭ, “Agressivnoe Nevezhestvo” (Aggressive ignorance), Yunost’, 
12 (1974); Nikolaĭ Nikolaev, “Salopnitsa pishet roman” (Scandalmonger writes a novel), 
Ogoniek, 48 (1964).
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They planned not a violent aggression, but a soft conquest: “they will go to Russia 
not with axes, not with gallows, but with banners of ideas of good, friendship of 
peoples.”39 In a certain sense, Kochetov is the Soviet John Le Carré, who almost 
at the same time (six years earlier) published the novel The Spy that Came from 
the Cold; abroad, the novel was correctly called “James Bond in reverse.”40 As for 
Piotr Strokov, a literary critic and longtime collaborator of Kochetov at the edito-
rial board of Oktîabr’, he interestingly enough noticed the resemblance between 
Kochetov’s novel and Gogol’s Dead Souls: “Chichikov visits the landlords in 
order to buy from them the dead souls of their peasants. Here Portsia Brown and 
co travel in order to deprave living souls.”41 Moreover, Kochetov did not just warn 
against foreign agents. He criticized the Soviet liberal artists as well; incidentally, 
following the publishing of the book, twenty members of the intelligentsia signed 
a letter protesting against the “obscurantist novel.” This is how they are described: 
“Miss Brown knew some Soviet writers, artists, directors who had signed an Ap-
peal calling the intelligentsia to change the system. She spoke about them with 
great sympathy.”42Among them were supporters of Abstract Expressionism, an art 
tendency the author is manifestly not fond of; when two heroes are invited to the 
office of the vice-director of the publishing house, they notice on the walls “ab-
stract bright spots and gloomy chaos in frames and without frames.”43
Hence, both novels illustrate the three main patterns of the Thaw. First, the 
neo-Stalinist line appears through constant reference to patriotism and to national 
pride linked with the victory during World War II. From that perspective, the 
Soviet Union played the role of the liberator of the world from absolute evil, 
i.e. the Nazis (second pattern). One can find an echo of this messianic discourse 
in Vladimir Putin’s will to “be remembered in history as the fighter against the 
jihadists.”44 Finally, although the theme of anti-Semitism is totally irrelevant con-
cerning the current president, he shares an instinctive and deep distrust with the 
two authors towards the liberal intelligentsia, also called by Kochetov the “edu-
cated bourgeois-individualist.”45 When asked about the loyalty of Russian elites 
and their role in the national history, Putin began by recalling “the existence in 
every society of bacilli destroying the state organism, which are activated when 
immunity falls off.” Then he quoted the poet Alexander Pushkin, who said that 
“there are many people who stand in opposition not against the government, but 
against Russia. Unfortunately, such a tradition exists in our intelligentsia,” con-
cluded the president,46 truly speaking as the Thaw ruler. 
39 Vsevolod Kochetov, Chego Zhe Ty Khochesh? (What Do You Want Then?) 
(Letchworth-Herts: Prideaux Press, 1970), 14.
40 Mark Slonim, The New York Times, December 14, 1969, 28.
41 Pyotr Strokov, Vsevolod Kochetov. Stranitsy zhizni, stranitsz tvorchestva (Vsevolod 
Kochetov. Pages of his Life and Work) (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1985), 341.
42 Kochetov, Chego Zhe Ty Khochesh?, 80.
43 Kochetov, Chego Zhe Ty Khochesh?, 68.
44 Staffan de Mistura, United Nations Envoy to Syria, in an interview to Swiss TV 
channel RTS on 19 October 2016.
45 Strokov, Vsevolod Kochetov, 163.
46 Interview of Vladimir Putin to Pervy Kanal and Associated Press on 3 September 
2013, right before the G20 Saint Petersburg Summit.
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2-Thaw II
The reset has failed, once again
Indeed, it is tempting to compare the period of peaceful coexistence between 
1955-1960 (Thaw I) with the short “reset” established by President Obama in 
2009 until 2014 (Thaw II). In both cases, after the Grand Alliance (Yalta in 1945 
and 9/11 in 2001) followed by a series of skirmishes (the rivalry in Western Eu-
rope after the war, color revolutions and the war in Georgia in the 2000s), the new 
host of the White House was holding out a hand to Russia. In 2009, the physical 
handing out of a reset button by Hillary Clinton to Sergey Lavrov in Geneva is 
not without reminding us of the 1955 “Spirit of Geneva;” later in July, President 
Obama himself flew to Moscow to meet President Putin. In both double mandates, 
the international political agenda was focused on four key issues: the nuclear 
question (“Atoms for Peace” and “Open Skies” in 1955 and the New START 
Treaty in 2010), Asia (Korea in particular), the Middle East (Operation AJAX in 
Iran and the Suez Crisis in the 1950s and the Syrian war today), and the fate of 
Europe. However, the front line moved from Berlin, with the Soviet ultimatum in 
1958, to the conflict in the Donbass. Also, in spite of the official line of appease-
ment, Thaws I and II were times of intense cultural infiltration and witch hunts.47 
All was happening as if the same diplomatic storyline were staged anew, and the 
outcome did not have a happy ending.
Eventually, those policies systematically failed and turned into huge crises, 
both paroxysmal and unexpected: the U2 incident caused the irrevocable break-
up between Khrushchev and Eisenhower. The overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych 
after the Maidan protests in winter 2014, followed by the crash of the plane MH17 
over the combat zone in Ukraine, have led to an open confrontation between the 
two countries and never-ending waves of economic sanctions. Finally, those se-
quences are similar even in their developments: after Kennedy’s short mandate, 
his successor was Lyndon Johnson, whose renowned “Johnson treatment” is not 
far from the dominating handshake of Donald Trump, or “Trump Pumps.” Be-
yond their psychological features, both presidents ran a policy oriented towards 
re-centering on domestic problems and international disengagement (such as the 
US withdrawal from the Paris climate accord, UNESCO and the Iran nuclear deal 
in 2017 and 2018). Against that background narrative, it seems as though the same 
political options are repeating themselves in contemporary Russia, but they are 
taking new shapes today.
47 The Soviet 1950s have counted noteworthy political processes (the most famous 
one is the Pasternak trial in 1958). On 13 July 2012, the Duma adopted the foreign agent 
law (Federal law N 121-ФЗ) compelling non-governmental organizations to designate 
themselves “foreign agents” if they engage in politics and are funded by foreign states. 
Also, an interesting fact is the resurfacing in 2014 of a ghost from the Thaw. General Phi-
lipp Bobkov, who was appointed in 1956 as a head of KGB Fourth Directorate (ideological 
counter espionage), published Struggling with “Agents of Influence?” How Putin Can Re-
build Russia (Moscow: Algoritm). In the US, the second Red Scare lasted until 1956. The 
US Justice Department has recently demanded state-funded RT channel Russia Today to 
register under the FARA (Foreign Agents Registration Act), what it eventually did on 13 
November 2017.
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Old patterns and new battlegrounds
For the Soviets, the main pattern of the Thaw is the relationship towards the 
US, perceived as a threat of seduction arousing a mix of fascination and fear, of 
appeal and distrust (see above). In his time, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson 
detected an inferiority complex.48 The latter might be explained by compensa-
tion through Khrushchev’s favorite idioms such as “We’ll catch up and overtake 
America,” “We’ll show you Kuzka’s mother”49 and today, the regular call of Rus-
sia to dialogue based on equal treatment with the US.50 The second feature is the 
neo-Stalinist discourse and the paradigm of victory, which finds an echo in con-
temporary public opinion51 and in the celebrations of Victory Day. Finally, the last 
pattern is the spiritual mission of the Soviet Union: after the 20th Congress, the 
commitment to Third World countries became important (although this idea was 
inherited from Vladimir Lenin). Khrushchev “regarded aid as the main instrument 
for carrying out Soviet policy and strategy,”52 to make a “peaceful transition” 
by post-colonial states towards socialism. Nowadays, instead of the communist 
path, the Kremlin promotes Russia as the keeper of Christianity in Europe and of 
the Christians in the Middle East with the open support of the Russian Orthodox 
Church;53 besides, it was not a coincidence that from March to June 2017 Patri-
arch’s Palace (one of the Moscow Kremlin Museums) was hosting an exhibition 
dedicated to Saint Louis, the pious French king who introduced reforms to renew 
the kingdom’s morality (for instance, he decided to punish the blasphemy and 
interest-blaming loans) and took part in the Seventh and Eight crusades. However, 
one may wonder if this mystical rhetoric corresponds to a genuine diplomatic aim 
per se; is it not rather a way to take the opposite view to the US and to reinforce 
the prestige of Russia in the international stage and its historical destiny?
48 Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 177. Llewellyn Thompson (1904-1972) served as 
American Ambassador in the Soviet Union from 1957 to 1962.
49 Meaning “we’ll teach you a lesson.” Khrushchev used it many times during his 
meetings with foreign leaders, in particular with Richard Nixon during the American exhi-
bition in Moscow.
50 See “we must finally begin to build relations on the basis of equality, mutual res-
pect, and of mutual consideration of interests.” Extract from Vladimir Putin’s speech at 
the Meeting of ambassadors and permanent representatives of Russia on 1 July 2014; see 
also “Putin tells Obama he wants dialogue based on equality and respect,” Reuters, July 4, 
2015. 
51 A poll conducted by the Levada Center in June 2017 showed that Russians consider 
Stalin, Putin and Pushkin as the most outstanding individuals in the history of mankind 
(they got respectively 38%, 34% and 34%). 
52 Gu Guan-Fu, “Soviet Aid to the Third World an Analysis of Its Strategy,” Soviet 
Studies, 35-1 (1983), 71-89, 71; see also, Ermarth Fritz, “The Soviet Union in the Third 
World: Purpose in Search of Power,” The ANNALS, April 1969. The “peaceful transition” 
approach to foreign aid was proposed by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress.
53 “Having started a military operation in Syria, Vladimir Putin began to be conside-
red a defender of Christians in the Middle East,” quoted from “Il Giornale: ROC defends 
the “political war” of Putin in Syria,” Russia Today, January 17, 2016 (russian.rt.com/
inotv/2016-01-17/Giornale-RPC-vstala-na-zashhitu, consulted on 10 September 2018)
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In any case, after the Soviet Union lost the ideological battle in 1991, the pro-
paganda war moved to new battlegrounds, for example, to economics. Tellingly, 
the most widespread weapons in economic warfare are sanctions. So how can 
these sanctions be considered as the tools of propaganda? To understand this shift, 
one has to keep in mind that propaganda is all about assumptions. In fact, the very 
word “sanction” implies that Russia is punished for its misconduct, it automati-
cally sets a specific ratio of power where the US are the severe teacher and Russia 
is the clumsy pupil. After 2014, the new confrontation was accompanied by sev-
eral waves of sanctions. Apart from measures striking a wide range of productive 
sectors or, on the contrary, some specific items of sensitive technologies, V.I.P. 
sanctions (also called smart sanctions) were introduced during the last years. They 
consist of raising the costs for the elites, following the example of the EU ban 
towards North Korea (in retaliation to its nuclear test in 2006, the EU banned 
exports of luxury goods). In the case of Russia, visa bans and asset freezes had 
already been implemented in 2012 in the frame of the Magnitsky Act. In 2014, it 
concerned individuals whose actions were found to “undermine democratic pro-
cesses and institutions in Ukraine,” namely tens of Russian officials.54 In addition, 
on 22 August 2017 the US Treasury ordered “U.S. title insurance companies to 
identify the natural persons behind shell companies used to pay for high-end resi-
dential real estate in seven metropolitan areas, including Miami-Dade, Broward, 
Palm Beach, New York and Los Angeles, the favorite Russian destinations.”55
Another aspect of the confrontation is the stadium war, which was significant 
during the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. If Olympics have always been the 
show case of the host nation—like the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow—the 
Sochi games were certainly a gigantic project to the glory of Putin’s Russia. The 
climax of the most expensive games in history was the opening ceremony, a live 
epic recounting Russian history with no less than 3,000 artists on the stage. More-
over, the boycott or support of the games were a kind of vote on strategic and 
ideological choices made by Russia for the other nations, concerning such topics 
like the conflict in Ossetia in 2008, the recent law on gay propaganda for minors 
passed in 2013, or the Maidan protests. Afterwards, the prestige of the games was 
strongly tarnished by the McLaren report, published in 2016 and detailing a state-
sponsored doping program operated by Russia; the latter caused a ban for Russian 
athletes from competing at the Rio 2016 Olympics and Paralympics. A reflection 
of the 1959 American Exhibition,56 this diplomatic sequence reminds one of the 
54 “Executive Order. Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situa-
tion in Ukraine.” The White House, March 6, 2014.
55 “Putin’s greatest weakness may be located on US shores,” The Hill, October 17, 
2017 (thehill.com/opinion/finance/355798-putins-greatest-weakness-may-be-on-us-
shores, consulted on 10 October 2018).
56 The Soviet Communist Party decided “to mount a massive propaganda campaign to 
counteract the potential appeal of the exhibition (…), depicting it as a blatant propaganda 
display that bore little relations to the realities of everyday life of the average U.S. citizen,” 
see Hixson, Parting the Curtauin, 185-186.
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quarrels between the best player and the fair player. Just like the sanctions, it 
consists in a struggle for moral superiority in order to legitimize one’s leadership.
The information war is the last field of confrontation. This art of war swallows 
all the other ones, opening new fronts and justifying the battles’ proceedings (like 
the announcement of new sanctions) by ethical and political categories. A merci-
less information war was raging during the most intense fighting in Ukraine57 and 
with regard to Russian interference in the last American elections. It consists of 
disinformation campaigns and of a tougher monitoring of social networks and 
news websites in order to control the national web space and to establish a “digital 
sovereignty.”58 Obviously today, with the democratization of smartphones and 
Internet, social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram, replaced the 
literary journals and jazz songs of the 1950s. And, for sure, Moscow is eager to 
have its say in the choir of tweets.
The Kremlin’s parade diplomacy
Unlike the successful integration of the Concert of Europe at the Congress 
of Vienna, the Russian attempt to join the ‘Atlantic symphony’ bitterly failed two 
centuries later. After the Georgian War in 2008, seen by the Kremlin as a challenge 
of its power in the “Near Abroad,” the government definitely changed the vector 
towards an enduring model separated from the rest of Europe. Besides, this shift 
took over the slavophile legacy, a nineteenth century intellectual current assuming 
the unique destiny of Russia and elaborated in Nikolay Danilevsky’s Russia and 
Europe (1871). Russia is believed to belong to a specific historical-cultural type 
designated as a Slavic world distinctive from the European one, and also called 
the “German-Roman.” According to the author, Russia’s otherness is related to its 
critical mass, to the hostility of the European powers, and to a peculiar state of 
mind of the Russian people articulated on its organic relation to its leader.
In 2006 already, Deputy Prime Minister Vladislav Surkov’s concept of “sov-
ereign democracy” hinted at a strong state policy, and the President’s Munich 
Speech (2007) marked a break with the unipolar system under American hege-
mony. But the geopolitical turn was still lacking an ideological content. In na-
tional history, the last state doctrine was the Stalinist one, also sometimes called 
“national-bolshevism” in the sense of state building on revolutionary principles.59 
However, if the Stalinist model was designed for the “work in progress” of the 
Soviet state, one has to keep in mind that only the Thaw has given the ideologi-
cal frame of the (almost) achieved Stalinist utopia. The Thaw, although discard-
ing Stalinism on moral grounds, paradoxically gave it a historical legitimacy. 
The latter lies in the fact that the country under Stalin won the war and made its 
breakthrough towards communism—the rest was quick to achieve. Communism 
57 Jill Dougherty, “Everyone Lies: the Ukraine Conflict and Russia’s Media Trans-
formation,” Discussion Papers n° 88, Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public 
Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2014.
58 Tsifrovoĭ suverenitet, the term was pronounced by MP Sergey Zhelezniak, in Eko-
nomika i Zhizn’, June 19, 2013.
59 Brandenberger, National Bolshevism.
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was fast approaching and Khrushchev’s model was projected in the near-future. 
Hence, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, by a conceptual gravity pulling the 
world politics towards the past, Russian ideology happened to be the one of the 
Thaw.60 Moreover, the Thaw is the biographical background of the majority of the 
contemporary leaders (Putin himself was born in 1952), so it can seem logical that 
the latter reproduced the worldview by which they were informed.
So, what is that ideology like? The backbone of the Thaw period is the vic-
tory of World War II and subsequent patriotic pride. Another key aspect of this 
paper is that the Thaw belongs to the anthropological realm of the carnival, which 
draws new Space Time coordinates. More precisely, the carnival brings about a 
narrowing of space around the society performing it; the construction of the Ber-
lin wall in 1961 epitomized this tendency. Consequently, experiencing the same 
thing at the same time, the social body gets more and more homogeneous. In 
addition, another typical characteristic of the carnival is the reversal of values; in 
the Rabelaisian tradition, the master becomes the servant, men dress like women, 
old ladies give birth and so on.61 Such a situation occurred after the ideological 
turnarounds in 1956 and in 1991: one morning, the people were told that all the 
previous values were false (the cult of Stalin, or the holiness of Bolshevik revolu-
tion), and everything that had been condemned therefore became praised. By the 
way, to this extent any expression with “post-” like “post-Soviet,” implies such 
a symbolic reversal. An exception to the common order, the carnival allows the 
neighboring of the opposite, a short sequence of truce between sworn enemies; 
called peaceful coexistence in the 1950s or friendship in the 2000s.62
As master of ceremonies, the king occupies a special place in this political 
ritual. But recently, the Thaw style was subjected to adjustments: Khrushchev’s 
peasant exuberance with his famous cheek and mimicry gave way to the secret 
services martial restraint; the white clown replaced the red clown. Staging sports 
60 Except from ideology, Putin’s policy resumes the Thaw policy on the three crucial 
issues: space, mass housing development and mass events (World Festival of Youth and 
Students in 1957 and the 2018 Football World Cup); see: “Putin: RF dolzhna sdelat’ mnogo 
shagov, shtoby vernut’ pervenstvo v kosmicheskoy otrasli,” in TASS, https://tass.ru/kos-
mos/5271251, 7 June, 2018; and “ In Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, Putin 
sets the target to build 120 millions of square meters of housing per year” in the article “Pu-
tin demanded anew to make housing affordable,” in Vedomosti, https://www.vedomosti.ru/
realty/articles/2018/03/01/752505-putin-zhile, 1st March, 2018. In addition, as a sign of the 
Zeitgeist, in 2017 the Tret’îakov Gallery dedicated an exhibition to the Thaw.
61 Mikhail Bakhtin, Tvortchestvo François Rabelais i narodnaîa kul’tura sredneve-
kov’îa i Renesansa (The Art of François Rabelais and the Popular Culture in the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance) (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaîa Literatura, 1965). Inspired by 
Bakhtin, David K. Danow recently proposed a study of the carnival where the latter is pre-
sented as an archetypal pattern of the human psyche, filling a fundamental need to dissolve 
boarders and allowing the merge of opposite forces (official and unofficial culture, life 
and death among others), cf. The Spirit of Carnival: Magical Realism and the Grotesque 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004).
62 “Cordial Rivals: How Bush and Putin Became Friends,” New York Times, June 18, 
2001.
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body language, the Russian leader enjoys showing himself in his swimming pool 
and gym at his Novo-Ogarevo personal residence. Also, the president often recalls 
his feats as a judoka and appreciates the company of athletes among the people 
close to him.63 Sometimes the mask of the former KGB agent falls and he too 
demonstrates the skills of the showman.64
In the Venetian tradition, the anonymity of the mask was giving social im-
munity to the citizens. By allowing escape from the strains of public morality 
without transgressing respectability, the mask was building a “private space in 
the public space.”65 Hence, the wearer of the mask was located in an “inviolable 
space.”66 However, anonymity here must not be confused with permissiveness; 
on the contrary, the mask has introduced moral codes into social life. First, in 
order to safeguard this inviolability, insult was prohibited; second, it ensured the 
republican equality by limiting ostentatious wealth; third, since aristocracy and 
foreign public figures had to wear a mask, it had limited contacts with the for-
eigners and the transmission of secrets that could be damaging for the Republic. 
Analogously, Khrushchev who had condemned the terror and thus, had given to 
the Soviet people political freedom, tried to codify public life with a set of moral 
values. As for the role of the social mask, it was devoted to literature, sparking off 
an ambivalent situation; on the one hand, the debates around books (criticism in 
the newspapers, readers’ letters, or just informal exchanges between the readers of 
official prose) created a free space of thought; on the other hand, political and lit-
erary institutions broadcasted a rigid official discourse on these books and a state 
discipline that influenced the readers’ opinions and restrained their freedom. So 
in the Thaw carnival, the ‘Bauta of literature’ was leaving the mouth of the Soviet 
people uncovered, allowing the expression of a made-up, but new subjectivity.
Another crucial feature of the carnival is time. With Khrushchev, the So-
viet official discourse made the shift from a performative model (Stalinist state 
building) to the reflexive perception of time. Like the burning of a mannequin at 
the climax of pagan celebrations, Soviet society under the Thaw was all turned 
towards the advent of the communist prophecy: “We will bury you!,” Khrushchev 
warned Western ambassadors in 1956; later he claimed that “the current genera-
tion of Soviet people will live under communism.” The difference lies in the fact 
63 See the official site of the Kremlin where the President is shown attending sambo 
and judo tournaments, or fishing during his holidays (putin.kremlin.ru, consulted on 
10 October 2018). Moreover, Vladimir Putin has granted foreign sportsmen Russian 
nationality: boxer Roy Jones in 2015, Australian track cyclist Shane Perkins in 2017.
64 See “Vladimir Putin sings and plays piano with celebrity friends” (www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/newsvideo/8196192/Vladimir-Putin-sings-and-plays-piano-with-celebrity-
friends.html, December 11, 2010, consulted on 10 October 2018), and “Putin jam: Russian 
president surprises audience, sings Soviet cosmonauts’ song” (www.rt.com/viral/375040-
putin-sings-to-guitar/ January 25, 2017, consulted on 10 October 2017). Also, at the mee-
ting of the club Valdai in October 2017, Putin commented on his participation in the upco-
ming elections by saying a joke on the impoverished oligarchs.
65 Gilles Bertrand, Histoire du Carnaval de Venise (Paris: Pygmalion, 2013), 142, 
124-151.
66 Bertrand, Histoire du Carnaval de Venise, 125.
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that Putin’s reflexive position is not turned towards the future but towards the 
past; if the Thaw literature was a promise fair, today the Kremlin’s rhetoric is a 
memories fair.
A good example is the celebration of the seventieth birthday of 9 May Vic-
tory day. One of the main events there was the immortal regiment: a huge pa-
rade of citizens carrying the portraits of their relatives who fought during the 
war throughout the main cities of the country. In Moscow, the cortege led by the 
president counted no less than five hundred thousand people who walked over 
Red Square to the Moskvoretzkaya embankment. From that perspective, the May 
9 parade can be seen as a typical carnival performance, where the portraits were 
used as masks, creating precisely a private space in the public space. In the ocean 
of the innumerable crowd, the very photographs of the beloved siblings were seals 
of anonymity. The social body, with his thousands of faces, was again unified 
behind its leader, saying the same prayer. In Putin’s Russia, the road to paradise 
goes back to the glorious past.
In the light of the carnival paradigm, it appears that the Kremlin’s foreign 
policy relates less to a crusade against any “evil empire” than to what can be 
called ‘parade diplomacy.’ Of course, foreign relations always include elements 
of drama, gesticulation and diversion. But the specificity of Moscow’s diploma-
cy—and it is particularly relevant concerning its cultural aspect—can be resumed 
in three words related to the practice of parade: reduction (of the political scope), 
reaction (instead of action), and impression (that the Kremlin wants to produce on 
its foreign partners).
Actually the Russian state conducts its policy within a narrow ideological 
frame where public space must be morally and politically homogeneous, similar 
to the carnival space. The official rhetoric consists of variations on the themes of 
the glorious imperial/ Soviet past, orthodox faith, peace and education, but at the 
same time it includes an aesthetic of strength (physical as well as military). Like 
during the Thaw, the fear of any subversion by “contaminated” ideas and values is 
still vivid;67 the sovereign domains of national history and knowledge are highly 
sensitive. Here one can find the reason for the revival in 2012 of the witch hunt di-
rected against the NGOs and other presumed foreign agents, among them Society 
Memorial (dedicated to the victims of the Soviet power) and Dynasty Foundation 
(for scientific research). Analogously, in the case of any ideological dissonance in 
an art work, authorities are tempted to decontaminate the public space resorting 
to censorship.
Autumn 2017 offered two dramatic cases of concurrent narratives on national 
myths. The first one, Matilda (dir. Alexey Uchitel), is a movie dealing with the 
romance between the young heir of the throne Nicholas II and a prima ballerina. 
On the one hundredth year anniversary of the Revolution, the film spurred out-
cry among the Orthodox Christians who deemed it blasphemous with regard to 
67 During the Presidential Council for Culture and Art on 30 May 2007, Vladimir Pu-
tin stressed on the importance “to protect the Russian cultural singularity and to reinforce 
the national cultural and moral values”; he mentioned the necessity to raise a “cultural 
immunity” (kul’turny immunitet) among the young generation.
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the memory of the holy Tsar. Natalia Poklonskaya, a Member of Parliament and 
a member of the United Russia party, said that the film “insults the feelings of 
religious believers” and called for it to be banned. Although the launching of the 
film was originally scheduled in March 2017, protests began as early as Novem-
ber 2016. Furthermore, in February, the Radical Orthodox movement Christian 
State-Holy Rus’ warned that “cinemas will burn” if Matilda was released. During 
the summer, another Orthodox activist drove a van containing gas canisters into a 
cinema in Yekaterinburg, the central Russian city where the royal family was mur-
dered. After the authorities condemned the violence and postponed the screen-
ing for security reasons, the film was finally issued a 16+ certificate in August. 
So, acting as arbitrator between the pressure of its political ally (the Orthodox 
Church) and the authors of cultural production who challenged the official narra-
tive, power uses the threat of censorship to alter the reception of the art work and 
to build a consensus on the national past. Besides, the resort to the conservative 
notes of the political keyboard has much in common with Khrushchev’s strategy. 
If the dominant narrative happened to be challenged by liberal voices, the lat-
ter used to let go of its lead the neo-Stalinist Cerberus, see Kochetov’s journal 
Oktîabr’. Such was the case in the debates on the war literature; members of 
Oktîabr’68 were supporting an epic view of the war held for the “historical truth” 
(pravda istorii) against the new wave of the military prose evoking the soldiers’ 
sufferings, mainly published in the liberal-oriented journal Novy Mir.69
The second example of the Kremlin’s cultural policy deals precisely with the 
myth of war. The film The Death of Stalin (dir. Armando Iannucci) relates, in a 
tone of comedy, the last days of the Soviet leader and the struggle for power fol-
lowing his death. Stalin himself and the Marshal Georgy Zhukov, the two official 
architects of the victory, are shown in a grotesque light. At one moment Marshal 
Zhukov kisses Khrushchev, an episode that inevitably carnavalizes the war hero, 
in other words explodes the myth onto him. The advisor from the Ministry of Cul-
ture immediately denounced a “planned provocation” that may have been “part 
of a Western plot to destabilize Russia.” After several twists and turns, the release 
of the film was eventually forbidden.70 Here, the political maneuvering matters 
as much as the final decision. The ban and the debates it has spurred are enough 
to shape the public reception of the movie. One could say that by taking into ac-
count today’s resources of downloading from the Internet, this censorship is rather 
informative than effective.
68 On the role of the journal Oktîabr’ in the ideological debates of the 1960s, and par-
ticularly on the “lieutenant prose,” see Evgeny Dobrenko, “Uroki Oktiabrîa” (The Lessons 
of Oktîabr’), Voprosy Literatury, 2 (1995), 27-55.
69 The so called “lieutenant prose” was opposed to the “marshal prose.” The former 
included protagonists who were often the junior officers; it was performed by authors like 
Yuri Bondarev, Vasil’ Bykov, Konstantin Vorobiov, Viatcheslav Kondratyev, Victor Ku-
rochkin and Grigoriĭ Baklanov. 
70 “Russia considers ban on Armando Ianucci’s film The Death of Stalin,” The Guard-
ian, September 20, 2017; “Russian Death of Stalin Distributor plans January Release,” The 
Hollywood Reporter, November 16, 2017; “Russian Culture Ministry yanks distribution 
certificate for The Death of Stalin,” TASS, January 23, 2018.
Raphaelle Auclert, The ‘Armed Thaw’ 131
Proceeding on from that, it appears that the Kremlin never acts but always 
reacts in the given paradigm. If it is it an artwork, it is censored (or threatened to 
be so); if it is economic sanctions, then counter-sanctions are implemented; in the 
case of allegations of Russian interference in European and American elections, 
so those are denied by the president. And yet, the cultural artillery offers many 
weapons in order to win hearts and minds and expand one’s influence: books, 
movies displaying alternative narratives, testimonies of the adversary’s former 
supporters…71 But such is not the Kremlin’s goal. Conducting parade diplomacy, 
Russian power wants to show itself on the international stage, performing a do-
mestic ritual at the same time. Diplomacy is thereby turned into an exhibition 
room, a Red Square on the world scale meant to display the jewels of the Russian 
civilization (the imperial palaces, literary classics)72 or arms shows,73 both are 
legacies from history. Firmly oriented towards the past, Moscow’s policy raises 
the masks of the war heroes or of the Olympic mascots to prompt an identification 
process and to build a national consensus. Its parade dimension, limited to goals 
of pomp or intimidation, also explains its inertia.
Conclusions
So, the present study underlined common ideological patterns, originally ar-
ticulated in the official prose, between the 1950s and Putin’s presidency. It also 
gave an insight into the new battlegrounds of Thaw II between Russia and the US. 
Those patterns serve until now as a compass for the Kremlin’s geopolitical strat-
egy. They consist in the staging of a political carnival, the revival of neo-Stalin-
ism, the fear of moral contamination by foreign values—in particular through the 
discourse of the liberal intelligentsia, and at the same time the proclamation of a 
Russian messianism. Moreover, defining its relations toward the US and Europe, 
Russia defines itself and draws its future. But the combination of the carnival 
dimension (by its very nature, an energy-consuming and temporary performance) 
with a conservative rhetoric, and the ageing of the ruling elites (most of them 
began their political career in the 1990s) presages that Thaw II might well be fol-
lowed by Stagnation II.
The fact remains that Putin, who deems the collapse of the Soviet Union “the 
greatest geopolitical tragedy of the century,”74 has to deal with the Soviet legacy, 
i.e. with the remnants of a system in which the ideological pillars have crumbled. 
As it has been shown, this challenge identifies him to Khrushchev after the 20th 
Congress. In other places in other times, such a situation reminds one of another 
71 In that vein, see Richard Crossman, The God that Failed (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1949). The volume gathered testimonies of famous ex-communists (among them 
Arthur Koestler and André Gide).
72 The Putin Interviews, dir. Oliver Stone, June 2, 2017.
73 From 14 until 17 September of the last year, during the joint strategic exercise 
“Zapad 2017” of Russian and Belarus armies, the Russian side has displayed 3,000 military 
personnel and about 280 vehicles, including up to 25 aircrafts and helicopters. For more 
details see “Details of Belarusian-Russian army exercise Zapad 2017 unveiled,” Belaru-
sian Telegraph Agency, March 20, 2017.
74 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly on 10 May 2006.
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ruler who lived far away in the past: the pharaoh Tutankhamun.75 The latter spent 
his entire reign undoing the radical religious innovations introduced by his fa-
ther, Akhenaten, who had replaced Egyptian traditional polytheism by the quasi-
monotheistic cult of the Aten. Unexpectedly, his political doctrine sheds light on 
the stakes of Russian strategy today: “Tutankhamun attempted the impossible: to 
go back before a revolution in order to regain the past and to fix it in its splendor; 
but the big spiritual principles had been beaten to death. Akhenaten had destroyed 
those things that could never be replaced: beliefs.”76 Thereby, on the ability to 
give a new life to those beliefs or to forge new ones will depend the legitimacy of 
Putin’s regime. Both imply the strongest cultural artillery ever.
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